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1. INTRODUCTION
Mainstream theories of international business usually assume 
that firms entering foreign markets have some strategic resources 
in terms of ownership of particular technologies, brands and/or 
organizational knowhow about the competitive advantages derived 
from internalizing operations in other countries (Cano-Kollmann at 
al., 2016). Less often, international business studies pay heed to the 
financial resources required in the process of internationalization. 
When financial studies and international business studies cross-
fertilize, their focus of attention tends to be the large corporation 
and the most recent period of globalization, deregulation and global 
movements of capital (Lazonick, 2010; Oxelheim et al., 2012; 
Berghoff, 2016).
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are not large firms on 
a small scale, but companies that have their own idiosyncrasies 
(Hollenstein, 2005). This can explain, for example, the resistance of 
many SMEs to the expansion if it means a loss of control for the 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
There is not enough research on the role played by finance in the expansion of industrial 
firms, especially in the case of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which, since the 
1980s, have had to face the challenges of the internationalization spurred on by the Second 
Globalization. In this article, we explore the subject through the Spanish case during the period 
1980-2000 and offer new information extracted from databases and a relevant case study: 
the financial background behind the transformation of the Grifols Group from a medium-sized 
business into a large global corporation. According to our research, the “pecking order” induces 
the increasing reliance of large firms on public funding, which means more bank credit available 
for the SMEs. From the study of the Grifols case we learn that to have a strong international 
partner eases the access to credit for the SMEs. 
RESUMEN DEL ARTÍCULO
No hay suficiente investigación sobre el papel desempeñado por la financiación en la 
expansión de las empresas industriales, especialmente en el caso de las pequeñas y medias 
empresas (PYMES) que, desde el decenio de 1980, han tenido que hacer frente a los retos 
de la internacionalización exigida por la Segunda Globalización. Este artículo constituye 
una aproximación al problema a través del caso español en 1980-2000, ofreciendo nueva 
información extraída de bases de datos y de un caso de estudio relevante: las claves 
financieras de la transformación del Grupo Grifols desde un negocio de tamaño mediano a 
una gran corporación global. De acuerdo con nuestra investigación, el funcionamiento del 
“pecking order” hace que las grandes empresas se alejen de la banca y haya más crédito 
bancario para las PYMES. El caso Grifols demuestra que ir acompañado de un socio 
internacional fuerte facilita el acceso al crédito de las PYMES. 
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founding partners, who, in many cases, are linked by kinship ties 
(James, 2006; Kobrak and Bunkanwanicha, 2013). However, the 
Second Globalization, which started in the 1980s, with its integration 
of markets across the world, has forced many SMEs to consider 
internationalization as the only way to survive in the new scenario. 
As internationalization is the most expensive formula for company 
growth, the issue of funding has become decisive (Beck et al., 2013; 
Sist, 2014).
The financing of a company is based on equity and debt. Today, 
it is accepted that there is a “pecking order”: companies start off 
with a preference for growing on their own resources and when 
these become insufficient they opt first for debt and then 
for equity (Myers, 1984; Baskin and Miranti, 1997). SMEs 
have always had problems with financing because they 
have been viewed as opaque and weak enterprises 
compared with larger ones (Berger and Udell, 1998 and 
2006). If resources are requested for internationalization, 
these problems become more serious because the SME 
will be exploring terra ignota, facing unknown competitors 
and unknown institutional frameworks. At the dawn of the 
twenty-first century, international organizations began 
to become aware of the importance of supporting the 
internationalization of SMEs, helping them to solve many 
problems, especially “the shortage of working capital to finance 
exports” that was identified as the first barrier (OECD, 2009, Table 1; 
see also European Commission, 2014).
In this article, we will provide new information on the process of 
internationalization of Spanish manufacturing SMEs and the role 
played by difficulties in accessing finance, a relevant issue that has 
deserved the attention of the international economic organizations. 
The period of study is 1980-2000, starting with the outbreak of 
the Second Globalization and ending with the implementation 
of the euro that transformed European financial systems. We 
adopt as methodology a business history approach, providing 
new unpublished historical archival evidence on the subject and 
presenting a relevant case study: the transformation of the Grifols 
Group from a medium-sized firm into a large globalized corporation 
in the two decades between 1980 and 2000. We will end with some 
lessons for SMEs that are planning to face internationalization.
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2. THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF INDUSTRY DURING 
THE SECOND GLOBALIZATION, 1980-2000: THE SPANISH 
CASE
The oil crises of the 1970s initiated a process of decline in the entire 
European manufacturing sector that has not yet ended. However, 
this decline has been compatible with the growth of some European 
industrial firms through exports and even their transformation 
into multinationals. This transformation has been very difficult for 
SMEs. In 2010, only 2 percent of European SMEs had recorded 
FDI (European Commission, 2014). However, it is true that some 
of them followed the pattern of large firms and as a distinguished 
scholar stated: “The reality of a vibrant, internationally competitive 
sector of relatively small family firms in Spain stands in stark 
contrast to the traditional complaint of economic historians, policy-
makers, and labor leaders alike that the lack of true entrepreneurs 
and the small size or raquitismo of Spanish firms have retarded the 
country’s development” (Guillén, 2005, 40-41; on the successful 
internationalization of some Spanish family firms, see Puig and 
Fernández Pérez, 2009; Fernández Pérez and Lluch, eds., 2015). 
The problem with some of these investments in internationalization 
would be unveiled some years later with the outbreak of the Great 
Recession: they had been accompanied by a high level of borrowing 
that would represent a heavy burden in depression times (Maudos 
and Fernández de Guevara, 2014).
However, the scholar was essentially right. In the Second 
Globalization era, we can identify a new generation of industrial 
SMEs whose strategies have been recorded since 1990 by 
the Sociedad Estatal de Participaciones Industriales (SEPI) 
Foundation’s Encuesta sobre Estrategias Empresariales (ESEE, or 
Survey on Business Strategies) (see www.fundacionsepi.es). The 
ESEE is based on a questionnaire with more than 100 questions 
answered by about 1,800 companies with 10 or more employees. 
The ESEE differentiates between SMEs and large companies, 
the latter being those with more than 200 employees. The survey 
gathers information about the variables that determine the 
competitiveness of Spanish manufacturing companies, including, of 
course, access to funding.
With the help of the ESEE database, we can see that the process 
of internationalization of Spanish manufacturing firms became 
significant after the entry of Spain into the European Economic 
KEY WORDS
Internationalization, 
finance, small and 
medium-sized 
enterprises, Spain.
PALABRAS CLAVE
Internacionalización, 
financiación, pequeñas 
y medianas empresas, 
España.
FINANCING THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF SPANISH INDUSTRIAL SMES, 1980-2000: THE 
CASE OF THE GRIFOLS GROUP
LA FINANCIACIÓN DE LA INTERNACIONALIZACIÓN DE LAS PYMES INDUSTRIALES ESPAÑO-
LAS, 1980-2000: EL CASO DEL GRUPO GRIFOLS
UNIVERSIA BUSINESS REVIEW | THIRD QUARTER 2017 | ISSN: 1698-5117
68
Community (EEC) (1986) and for all types of businesses (Figure 
1). In the 1990s, large companies outpaced SMEs in the conquest 
of foreign markets. By 2000, more than 35 percent of the sales of 
large companies were heading abroad, while SMEs were struggling 
to overcome the 25-percent barrier. In both cases, what would spur 
their exports would be the outbreak of the Great Recession in 2008. 
Spain has been hit very hard by this crisis and the contraction of 
the domestic market has led all kinds of companies to ensure their 
survival by selling in foreign markets. However, SMEs are still much 
less internationalized than large companies, as predicted by basic 
economic theory (the lower productivity of SMEs is understood as a 
severe hindrance).
Figure 1. Exports over total sales for Spanish manufacturing firms, 
1990–2000 (percent) 
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
05
00
1990    1991    1992    1993    1994   1995    1996    1997   1998    1999    2000
LARGE SMEs
Source: Compiled by authors using data from the ESEE database.
All business expansion needs financing. There are no sources 
providing detailed information on how internationalization was 
financed, but it is clear that during the Second Globalization era 
this was the most important form of expansion. If we study access 
to financing during this period, we can discover answers as to how 
companies funded the most decisive challenge of the late twentieth 
and early twenty-first century: internationalization. In Figures 2 and 
3, two of the most characteristic features of such funding are shown 
using information from the ESEE database.
JOSÉ LUIS GARCÍA RUIZ & PALOMA FERNÁNDEZ PÉREZ
UNIVERSIA BUSINESS REVIEW | THIRD QUARTER 2017 | ISSN: 1698-5117
69
On the one hand, there was a decline in the importance of banks 
as a source of funding for manufacturing companies, especially 
with regard to large companies. In the growing recourse to equity, 
a very active role began to be played by investment funds for large 
enterprises and venture capital firms for SMEs (Maroto and Melle, 
2000; Salas, 2013).
In the early 1990s, SMEs reduced their dependency on banks at the 
same rate as large companies, but since then the process has been 
reversed and the gap in bank financing between large enterprises 
and SMEs has widened.
On the other hand, there is an element that remains the same: 
SMEs have continuously suffered higher bank financing costs 
(interest rates plus commissions) than large firms, which has 
contributed to their lower competitiveness and, probably, to their 
lower level of internationalization. In any case, in the twenty-first 
century, the characteristic loose monetary policy of the Eurozone 
has placed these costs at very low levels for all kinds of firms. By 
combining the increased availability of credit (in part due to large 
firms turning away from banks) with the maintenance of low costs, 
we can understand how access to finance has been reduced in its 
significance among the problems of European SMEs (see Survey 
on the Access to Finance of Enterprises or SAFE database at www.
ecb.europa.eu).
Figure 2. Bank financing over external resources for Spanish 
manufacturing firms, 1991-2000 (percent) 
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Another source for analyzing the financing of industrial enterprises 
in the late twentieth century is the Central Balance Sheet Data 
Office (CBSO) database created by the Bank of Spain in 1983 
to compile and store economic and financial information on the 
activities of Spanish non-financial companies in order to obtain a 
better understanding of this subsector (the CBSO can be found at 
www.bde.es). At the European level, other central banks advanced 
in the same direction, enabling the recent creation of the BACH 
(Bank of the Accounts of Companies Harmonized) database, which 
has gathered historical annual data since 1990 (see www.bach.
banque-france.fr). 
Information from the databases is homogeneous and has been 
available on the Internet since 2000. The previous period (1983-
2000) was the subject of a study where, above all, the authors 
tried to determine if the liberalization of the financial system that 
characterized those years had led to changes in the financial 
structure of Spanish companies (Muñoz Porcar and Rosell Martínez, 
2002). It was a period of expansion marked by the incorporation of 
Spain into the EEC (1986), which accelerated trade flows and the 
transformation of a group of Spanish companies into multinationals, 
operating mainly in Latin America. The authors of the study found 
that in the CBSO database SMEs were abundant (87 percent in 
1997), although their contribution to total GVA was very low (15.6 
Figure 3. Cost of long-term bank loans for Spanish manufacturing 
firms, 1991-2000 (percent) 
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percent in 1997) (Muñoz Porcar and Rosell Martínez, 2002, 185). 
They understood correctly that it was necessary to separate SMEs 
from large companies in order to properly address the issue.
The results left no room for doubt. The liberalization of the financial 
system had very soon led to a loss of weight of institutions versus 
markets, but this sort of diversification had benefited only the large 
companies. SMEs continued to have difficulties in accessing any 
type of outside funding: “this evidence suggests that the SMEs 
group is affected by financial restrictions, so that its growth should 
be in line with the generation of internal resources” (Muñoz Porcar 
and Rosell Martínez, 2002, 204, own translation).
The analysis of sources of funds indicated that “large companies get 
most of their funding from external sources and in particular through 
the contributions of shareholders (20-30 percent), while in small 
businesses it is the financing of credit institutions that represents 
a more stable percentage of the total investment. Also relevant is 
the minor importance of financing through bonds, not only for small 
businesses but also for the large ones” (Ibid.). The work ended by 
claiming that “large Spanish companies have accessed this market 
[the stock market] to finance a substantial portion of the investments 
they have made in their internationalization process” (Muñoz Porcar 
and Rosell Martínez, 2002, 205, own translation).
Case studies provide an in-depth way to approach the complexities 
of the trajectory of Spanish industrial SMEs. In the following 
section, a chronological overview of the history of growth and 
internationalization of Grifols is presented in order to illustrate how 
the restrictions of the Spanish economy influenced changes in 
the financial strategies adopted by a medium-sized company that 
undertook commercial activities and investments abroad. This is a 
success story because Grifols evolved from a small family-owned 
laboratory run by two people in 1940 to one of the top three global 
corporations in the plasma industry in the 21rst century, within a 
context of flexible adaptation to the financial resources available to 
SMEs in Spain in the period under analysis.
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3. GRIFOLS: THE SECOND STAGE, 1980-2000
Laboratorios Grifols S.A. was a medium-sized company between 
1960 and 1982, and a global corporation investing abroad after 
1982. The company has published three books about their history 
of technological innovation (Grifols, 2000; Grifols Lucas, 2012; 
Grifols, 2015), but very little is known about the financial drawbacks 
they had to face in their history of growth and internationalization, 
accelerated after the 1980s.
The company was registered in Barcelona in1940, focused on 
clinical analysis. It was established by a graduate in Medicine, José 
Antonio Grifols Roig, in partnership with his wife, Magdalena Lucas. 
An analysis of the economic data and the business strategies to 
grow and invest abroad has been possible with access granted to 
original archival material and interviews with the financial staff in 
the Grifols archives in Barcelona and Sant Cugat del Vallés: the 
Historical Archive of the Museu Grifols (HAMG) and the Historical 
Archive of the Grifols Headquarters (HAGH).
Very early on in the late 1940s and above all in the 1950s, the Grifols 
family established and consolidated commercial contacts with 
North American corporations that were  leaders in hospital supply 
equipment and plasma derivative production. Dade Reagents Inc. 
(DR) of Miami, Florida, was their first partner. DR produced blood 
serums and solutions and their exclusive distributor in the United 
States in the 1950s was American Hospital Supply (AHS). In 1956, 
DR became a subsidiary of AHS. Soon afterwards, in 1960, the joint 
venture Dade Grifols was forged. This joint venture facilitated regular 
imports of much-needed reagents and solutions and the beginning 
of regular exports of plasma products from the Grifols blood bank 
and Laboratorios Grifols to the United States and Sweden up until 
the late 1960s. Between 1961 and 1966, exports represented 
more than half the total sales of the Grifols firms. The good times 
ended abruptly due to a regulatory change. In 1965, a Spanish law 
prohibited the export of human blood products and Grifols exports to 
the United States and Europe gradually declined and disappeared 
after 1968 - the prohibition lasted until the last days of Francoism.
The firm could well have disappeared at that moment, due to 
threats in their domestic market from negative new regulation and 
the pressure of big local competitors (particularly, Hubber, owned 
by Felix Gallardo). The choice was disappearance, or growth. The 
energy and self-confidence in the historically accumulated internal 
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technological and scientific know-how of an outward-looking family 
made the second decision be the final one. But the family lacked 
financial and organizational resources to grow, or strategic know-
how of global markets where the small lab could find alliances they 
could not find at home. 
Dade Grifols increased much needed financial resources the 
small lab could not obtain at home due to the above obstacles 
and their small size. Also, the alliance contributed intangible 
assets which were expensive and difficult to obtain at home: the 
professionalization and modernization of production and distribution 
facilities, following North American models, which reduced losses 
throughout their value chain. The North American partners accepted 
the Grifols’ policy of restricting and limiting the distribution of annual 
dividends, maintaining profits for the firm’s internal reserve. This 
allowed the accumulation of internal resources that allowed the 
construction of a brand new factory in Parets del Vallés in the last 
years of the 1960s, with reduced exposure to bank loans. 
The second generation of the Grifols family, with Víctor Grifols 
Lucas at the head, was responsible for the first steps in 
internationalization during Francoism. After Franco’s demise in 
1975, the third generation of Víctor Grifols Roura followed the 
family tradition of strategic alliances with leaders in their field and 
in 1982 sealed a new alliance with Alpha Therapeutic Corporation 
(ATC), the North American subsidiary of the Japanese global Green 
Cross Corporation. After 1975, and particularly after 1982, mass 
production techniques, global channels of distribution, long-term 
capital invested by foreign banks and investors and professional 
managers in business administration were introduced very rapidly.
The partnership with ATC represented a radical change in the 
company’s international department. Víctor Grifols Lucas and his 
son, Víctor Grifols Roura, travelled to China in 1983, the first year 
of the partnership, to start exports in a country where they had no 
idea how to do business. The Green Cross Corporation, owner 
of ATC, asked Grifols to export their plasma products together 
with Grifols’ own products to China - at that time Japanese blood 
products were forbidden in China. From 1983 to 1985, the Grifols 
entrepreneurs learnt how difficult it was to find even a secretary 
through the embassy to start the paperwork to establish a 
commercial representative and to export to China, and experienced 
great organizational difficulties of every kind. After 1982, when news 
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of the AIDS epidemic started to spread, with recommendations from 
the American Food and Drug Administration to heat blood stocks, 
China increased controls and stopped imports.
In 1989 the name of the joint venture was established as Alpha 
Grifols. ATC is also very significant for understanding two key 
elements of the 1980s and 1990s (their relationship ended in 
1999): (i) the fast speed of the joint venture’s acquisitions and 
foreign direct investment; and (ii) its privileged contacts with foreign 
banks that provided huge amounts of external capital with which to 
finance international expansion and modernization in production, 
distribution, and the managerial professionalization of the group. As 
the statistical information indicates, it was during the joint venture 
with ATC that three new focuses were added to the Grifols Group’s 
previous trajectory: these were (i) long-term capital endowment from 
outside sources; (ii) huge investments in Europe, America, and Asia; 
and (iii) a rapid decline in the percentage of sales represented by 
the Spanish market in the structure of the group’s total sales (Figure 
4).
New premises, companies, and acquisitions evolved as follows: 
Portugal (1988), Argentina (1991), Mexico (1993), Germany/
Italy/United Kingdom (1997), Brazil (1998), and Slovakia/France 
(1999). In 1999, ATC and Grifols ended their joint venture due to 
a combination of problems related to a broader crisis affecting the 
Green Cross Corporation in Japan and its subsidiaries in Europe, 
and to disagreements about how to manage the uncertainty of the 
first years of the AIDS epidemic in the industry (from a technical 
point of view). After their friendly separation, Grifols felt strong 
enough and with enough resources and know-how to go it alone and 
invested in subsidiaries in Malaysia in 2003, in Poland in 2004, and 
in the United States in 2006, in representative offices in Japan in 
2006 and in China in 2007, and in more subsidiaries in Switzerland 
in 2009 and in Colombia and Nordic countries in 2010. 2011 was 
the year of their large acquisition of Talecris in the United States for 
around 3,000 million US dollars, which was followed in 2014 with 
some assets from Novartis Diagnostics and in 2015 by the purchase 
of 45 percent of Alkahest, both also in the United States. In recent 
years, beyond the United States, Grifols has increased its presence 
in Canada and Ireland.
Information from the corporation reveals that long-term sources of 
external capital played an increasingly relevant role in financing, 
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innovations and patents, and acquisitions abroad. Internal resources 
became insufficient and syndicated bank loans, with a combination 
of local and foreign banks, made their appearance (Figures 5 and 
6). After 2006, when Grifols was listed on the Spanish stock market, 
more dispersed investors contributed external capital to the group 
from all over the world.
As a result of the speed and extent of the Grifols Group’s 
internationalization, exports rapidly increased, representing 96 
percent of total sales in 2015in comparison to only 4 percent of total 
sales in the early 1980s. It was a radical change in the structure of 
the destination market for the business’s sales. Also, the partnership 
with ATC granted Grifols leadership in the Spanish blood derivatives 
market in the1980s, which coincided with a process of concentration 
of human blood industries in Spain.
The partnership with ATC ended in 1999 but the Spanish financial 
and commercial departments of Grifols had by then learnt how 
to co-operate as a global corporation. During the first 15 years 
of the twenty-first century, staff graduated in business and 
economics in local institutions received fast practical training in 
how to export worldwide, how to operate with European and North 
American corporations, and how to obtain licenses in the toughest 
pharmaceutical markets of the world where the highest return on 
investments could be obtained. The accumulation of lessons and 
resources among Grifols’ human capital also meant a capacity 
Figure 4. Grifols’ Exports/Total Sales ratio, 1990–2000 (percent)
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Figure 5. Grifols’ sales and profits, 1975–2000 (millions of euros)
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Figure 6. Amount of Grifols’ syndicated bank loans, 1988–2001 (millions of euros)
1988 1992 1995 1998 2001
Note: 1988: 15.0 million euros for five years with Lloyds Bank leading a group of 18 banks; 1992: 17.4 
million euros for three years and three months with Lloyds Bank and the Bank of Tokyo leading a 
group of 15 banks; 1995: 22.5 million euros for five years with Caixa de Barcelona and Deutsche Bank 
leading a group of 18 banks; 1998: 42.1 million euros for six months with Deutsche Bank and BBVA 
leading a group of 20 banks; 2001: 90.0 million euros for five years with BBVA, Deutsche Bank, Banc 
Sabadell, Banco Urquijo, Banesto, the Bank of Tokyo, and HSBC leading a group of 38 banks.
Source: Compiled by authors using data from the HAMG.
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to deal with global sources of financing for internationalization, 
throughout the years when deregulation and the globalization of 
finances offered many opportunities for global investment and 
funding. Grifols had enough strength to take advantage of the new 
abundance of opportunities to access capital and to invest in tough 
markets, and it did so in Western Europe and the United States first 
and later also in Asia.
4. CONCLUSION
Very few studies in business history have paid attention to industrial 
SMEs’ difficulties in accessing finance, a key element for their 
expansion, especially abroad. This is the major original contribution 
of this paper, which combines a general approach to new sources on 
investment policies in industry in the Spanish financial system with 
a case study approach looking at the history of internationalization 
and the financial options of Grifols, a small lab that became the third 
largest global corporation in plasma derivatives in the first decade of 
the twenty-first century.
After the oil crises, the withdrawal of active industrial policies 
that concentrated the resources in the large firms, the Spanish 
incorporation into the EEC (1986), and the processes of the Second 
Globalization provided new opportunities for SMEs, improving their 
access to finance and internationalization. According to the “pecking 
order” model (Myers, 1984), this new financing came essentially 
from financial institutions (banks), because the financial markets 
remained beyond the reach of most SMEs. A factor that allowed 
more bank loans for SMEs was the preference of large firms for 
equity over debt. Thus, the rise of the big Spanish multinationals in 
the 1990s was mainly funded through financial markets. In this new 
context, SMEs became more attractive to banks.
The Grifols case illustrates how in the second half of the twentieth 
century an innovative medium-sized Spanish firm was able to 
transform itself and grow, from a small family business, into a 
medium-sized firm, and finally into a true global corporation 
investing abroad, despite the above mentioned financial restrictions. 
New evidence from archival sources suggests that Grifols is a 
good example of the importance of the life cycle of the firm in 
internationalization processes (Sist, 2014). The opportunity to 
supply specialized products, not provided by large public and private 
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companies, to the increasing number of public and private hospitals 
in Spain after the 1960s required new resources: technology, 
organizational know-how and capital. These resources were sought 
among leading corporations in the United States, with whom the 
small lab signed joint venture agreements and technological and 
commercial alliances in the 1960s and the 1970s.
The new partners served as a type of business school for Grifols, 
helping it go beyond exports and to decisively start ambitious 
foreign investment activity in Europe, Latin America, North America, 
and Asia after the 1990s. In this “growth stage” (Sist, 2014) of the 
group’s life cycle, Grifols demanded larger and more long-term 
stable sources of outside capital than what had been required 
before. Grifols’ access to external finance followed the general 
“pecking order” model (first debt, then equity), with syndicated bank 
loans playing a crucial role.
The main lesson of this paper is that the setting of an appropriate 
relationship between an SME and a strong foreign partner can be 
a way to overcome the difficulties for the SMEs to raise funds from 
the banks in order to launch a process of internationalization. That 
relationship works as a “seal of approval” that eases the financing of 
the SME’s projects.
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